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Abstract- Cloud Computing has been envisioned as the next-generation architecture of IT Enterprise. It moves the
application software and databases to the centralized large data centers, where the management of the data and services may
not be fully trustworthy. This unique paradigm brings about many new security challenges, which have not been well
understood. This work studies the problem of ensuring the integrity of data storage in Cloud Computing. In particular, we
consider the task of allowing a threshold proxy re-encryption, on behalf of the cloud client, to verify the integrity of the
dynamic data stored in the cloud. The introduction of TPA eliminates the involvement of the client through the auditing of
whether his data stored in the cloud are indeed intact, which can be important in achieving economies of scale for Cloud
Computing. The distributed storage system not only supports secure and robust data storage and retrieval, but also lets a user
forward his data in the storage servers to another user without retrieving the data back, since services in Cloud Computing
are not limited to archive or backup data only. While prior works on ensuring remote data integrity often lacks the support of
either public Audit ability or dynamic data operations, this paper achieves both. We first identify the difficulties and
potential security problems of direct extensions with fully dynamic data updates from prior works and then show how to
construct an elegant verification scheme for the seamless integration of these two salient features in our protocol design A
decentralized erasure code is an erasure code that independently computes each codeword symbol for a message, where TPA
can perform multiple auditing tasks simultaneously. Extensive security and performance analysis show that the proposed
schemes are highly efficient and provably secure.
Keywords- Decentralized erasure code, proxy re-encryption, threshold cryptography, secure storage system.

As high-speed networks and ubiquitous Internet
access become available in recent years, many
services are provided on the Internet such that users
can use them from anywhere at any time. For
example, the email service is probably the most
popular one. Cloud computing is a concept that treats
the resources on the Internet as a unified entity, a
cloud. Users just use services without being
concerned about how computation is done and
storage is managed. In this paper, we focus on
designing a cloud storage system for robustness,
confidentiality, and functionality. A cloud storage
system is considered as a large scale distributed
storage system that consists of many independent
storage servers.

failure servers is under the tolerance threshold of the
erasure code, the message can be recovered from the
codeword symbols stored in the available storage
servers by the decoding process. This provides a
tradeoff between the storage size and the tolerance
threshold of failure servers. A decentralized erasure
code is an erasure code that independently computes
each codeword symbol for a message. Thus, the
encoding process for a message can be split into n
parallel tasks of generating codeword symbols. A
decentralized erasure code is suitable for use in a
distributed storage system. After the message
symbols are sent to storage servers, each storage
server independently computes a codeword symbol
for the received message symbols and stores it. This
finishes the encoding and storing process. The
recovery process is the same.

Data robustness is a major requirement for storage
systems. There have been many proposals of storing
data over storage servers [1], [2], [3], [4], [5]. One
way to provide data robustness is to replicate a
message such that each storage server stores a copy
of the message. It is very robust because the message
can be retrieved as long as one storage server
survives. Another way is to encode a message of k
symbols into a codeword of n symbols by erasure
coding. To store a message, each of its codeword
symbols is stored in a different storage server. A
storage server failure corresponds to an erasure error
of the codeword symbol. As long as the number of

Storing data in a third party’s cloud system causes
serious concern on data confidentiality. In order to
provide strong confidentiality for messages in storage
servers, a user can encrypt messages by a
cryptographic method before applying an erasure
code method to encode and store messages. When he
wants to use a message, he needs to retrieve the
codeword symbols from storage servers, decode
them, and then decrypt them by using cryptographic
keys. There are three problems in the above
straightforward integration of encryption and
encoding. First, the user has to do most computation
and the communication traffic between the user and
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storage servers is high. Second, the user has to
manage his cryptographic keys. If the user’s device of
storing the keys is lost or compromised, the security
is broken. Finally, besides data storing and retrieving,
it is hard for storage servers to directly support other
functions. For example, storage servers cannot
directly forward a user’s messages to another one.
The owner of messages has to retrieve, decode,
decrypt and then forward them to another user.

III. DRAWBACKS OF EXISTING SYSTEM
1) The user can perform more computation and
communication traffic between the user and
storage servers is high.
2) The user has to manage his cryptographic
keys otherwise the security has to be broken.
3) The data storing and retrieving, it is hard for
storage servers to directly support other
functions.
4) The user is unable to share the data
confidentiality to the destination.

In this paper, we are address the problem of directly
data forwarding to another user by storage servers
under the control of the data owner. We consider the
system model that consists of distributed storage
servers and key servers. Since storing cryptographic
keys in a single device is precarious, a user distributes
his cryptographic key to key servers that shall
perform cryptographic functions on behalf of the
user. These key servers are highly protected by
security mechanisms. To well fit the distributed
structure of systems, we require that servers
independently perform all operations. With this
consideration, we propose a new threshold proxy reencryption scheme and integrate it with a secure
decentralized code to form a secure distributed
storage system. The encryption scheme supports
encoding operations over encrypted messages and
forwarding operations over encrypted and encoded
messages. The tight integration of encoding,
encryption, and forwarding makes the storage system
efficiently meet the requirements of data robustness,
data
confidentiality,
and
data
forwarding.
Accomplishing the integration with consideration of a
distributed structure is difficult. Our system meets the
requirements that storage servers independently
perform encoding and re-encryption and key servers
independently perform partial decryption. Moreover,
we consider the system in a more general setting than
previous works. This setting allows more flexible
adjustment between the number of storage servers
and robustness.

Fig. 1. A general system model of our work.

IV. PROPOSED SYSTEM
In the proxy Re-encryption key the messages are first
encrypted by the owner and then stored in a storage
server. When a user wants to share his messages, he
sends a re-encryption key to the storage server. The
storage server re-encrypts the encrypted messages for
the authorized user. Thus, their system has data
confidentiality and supports the data forwarding
function. An encryption scheme is multiplicative
homomorphic if it supports a group operation on
encrypted plaintexts without decryption. The
multiplicative homomorphic encryption scheme
supports the encoding operation over encrypted
messages. We then convert a proxy re-encryption
scheme with multiplicative homomorphic property
into a threshold version. A secret key is shared to key
servers with a threshold value t. To decrypt for a set
of k message symbols, each key server independently
queries 2 storage servers and partially decrypts two
encrypted codeword symbols. As long as t key
servers are available, k codeword symbols are
obtained from the partially decrypted cipher texts.
The distributed systems require independent servers
to perform all operations. We propose a new
threshold proxy re-encryption scheme and integrate it
with a secure decentralized code to form a secure
distributed storage system. The encryption scheme
supports encoding operations over encrypted
messages and forwarding operations over encrypted
and encoded messages.

II. EXISTING SYSTEM
In Existing System we use a straightforward
integration method. In straightforward integration
method Storing data in a third party’s cloud system
causes serious concern on data confidentiality. In
order to provide strong confidentiality for messages
in storage servers, a user can encrypt messages by a
cryptographic method before applying an erasure
code method to encode and store messages. When he
wants to use a message, he needs to retrieve the
General
encryption
schemes
protect
data
confidentiality, but also limit the functionality of the
storage system because a few operations are
supported over encrypted data. A decentralized
architecture for storage systems offers good
scalability, because a storage server can join or leave
without control of a central authority.

V. PROXY RE-ENCRYPTION SCHEMES
In a proxy re-encryption scheme, a proxy server can
transfer a ciphertext under a public key
to a new
one under another public key
by using the re-
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encryption key
. The server does not know
the plaintext during transformation. Ateniese et al.[6]
proposed some proxy re-encryption schemes and
applied them to the sharing function of secure storage
systems. In their work, messages are first encrypted
by the owner and then stored in a storage server.
When a user wants to share his messages, he sends a
re-encryption key to the storage server. The storage
server re-encrypts the encrypted messages for the
authorized user. Thus, their system has data
confidentiality and supports the data forwarding
function. Our work further integrates encryption, reencryption, and encoding such that storage robustness
is strengthened.

receive less than message blocks and we
assume that all storage servers know the value
in advance.
3) In the data forwarding phase, user A forwards
his encrypted message with an identifier ID
stored in storage servers to user B such that B
can decrypt the forwarded message by his
secret key. To do so, A uses his secret key
to compute a reand B’s public key is
encryption key
and then sends
to all storage servers. Each storage server uses
the re-encryption key to re-encrypt its
codeword symbol for later retrieval requests by
B. The re-encrypted codeword symbol is the
combination of cipher texts under B’s public
key. In order to distinguish re-encrypted
codeword symbols from intact ones, we call
them original codeword symbols and reencrypted codeword symbols, respectively.

Type-based proxy re-encryption schemes proposed
by Tang [7] provide a better granularity on the
granted right of a re-encryption key. A user can
decide which type of messages and with whom he
wants to share in this kind of proxy reencryption
schemes. Key-private proxy re-encryption schemes
are proposed by Ateniese et al. [8]. In a key-private
proxy re-encryption scheme, given a re-encryption
key, a proxy server cannot determine the identity of
the recipient. This kind of proxy re-encryption
schemes provides higher privacy guarantee against
proxy servers. Although most proxy re-encryption
schemes use pairing operations, there exist proxy reencryption schemes without pairing [9].

4) In the data retrieval phase, user A requests to
retrieve a message from storage servers. The
message is either stored by him or forwarded to
him. User A sends a retrieval request to key
servers. Upon receiving the retrieval request
and executing a proper authentication process
with user A, each key server
requests u
randomly chosen storage servers to get
codeword symbols and does partial decryption
on the received codeword symbols by using the
key share
, . Finally, user A combines the
partially decrypted codeword symbols to obtain
the original message M.

VI. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1, our system model consists of
users, n storage servers SS1; SS2; . . . ; SSn, and m
key servers KS1;KS2; . . . ; KSm. Storage servers
provide storage services and key servers provide key
management services. They work independently. Our
distributed storage system consists of four phases:
system setup, data storage, data forwarding, and data
retrieval. These four phases are described as follows.
1)

System recovering: When a storage server fails, a
new one is added. The new storage server queries k
available storage servers, linearly combines the
received codeword symbols as a new one and stores
it. The system is then recovered.

In the system setup phase, the system manager
chooses system parameters and publishes them.
Each user A is assigned a public-secret key pair
;
User A distributes his secret key
to key servers such that each key server
holds a key share
. The
, ;1
key is shared with a threshold t.

VII. THREAT MODEL
We consider data confidentiality for both data storage
and data forwarding. In this threat model, an attacker
wants to break data confidentiality of a target user. To
do so, the attacker colludes with all storage servers,
nontarget users, and up to
1 key servers.

2) In the data storage phase, user A encrypts his
message M and dispatches it to and dispatches
it to storage servers. A message M is
…….
and
decomposed into k blocks
has an identifier ID. User A encrypts each
into a cipher text and sends it to
block
randomly chosen storage servers. Upon
receiving cipher texts from a user, each storage
server linearly combines them with randomly
chosen coefficients into a codeword symbol
and stores it. Note that a storage server may

The attacker analyzes stored messages in storage
servers, the secret keys of nontarget users, and the
shared keys stored in key servers. Note that the
storage servers store all re-encryption keys provided
by users.
The attacker may try to generate a new re-encryption
key from stored re-encryption keys. We formally
model this attack by the standard chosen plaintext
attack1 of the proxy re-encryption scheme in a
threshold version, as shown in Fig. 2.
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3) More flexible adjustment between the
number of storage servers and robustness.
IX. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The data confidentiality of our cloud storage system
is guaranteed even if all storage servers, nontarget
users, and up to
1 key servers are compromised
by the attacker. Recall the security game illustrated in
Fig. 2.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we consider a cloud storage system
consists of storage servers and key servers. We
integrate a newly proposed threshold proxy reencryption scheme and erasure codes over exponents.
The threshold proxy re-encryption scheme supports
encoding, forwarding, and partial decryption
operations in a distributed way. To decrypt a message
of k blocks that are encrypted and encoded to n
codeword symbols, each key server only has to
partially decrypt two codeword symbols in our
system. By using the threshold proxy re-encryption
scheme, we present a secure cloud storage system
that provides secure data storage and secure data
forwarding functionality in a decentralized structure.
Moreover, each storage server independently
performs encoding and re-encryption and each key
server independently performs partial decryption.

Fig. 2. The security game for the chosen plaintext attack.

The challenger provides the system parameters.
After the attacker chooses a target user , the
challenger gives him
1 key shares of the secret
of the target user
to model
1
key
compromised key servers. Then, the attacker can
query secret keys of other users and all re-encryption
keys except those from to other users. This model
compromised nontarget users and storage servers. In
the challenge phase, the attacker chooses two
messages
and
with the identifiers
and
,
respectively. The challenger throws a random coin
with ’ public key
and encrypts the message
. After getting the ciphertext from the
challenger, the attacker outputs a bit ′ for guessing b.
.
In this game, the attacker wins if and only if ′
The advantage of the attacker is defined as 1 2
Pr ′
.

Our storage system and some newly proposed content
addressable file systems and storage system [27],
[28], [29] are highly compatible. Our storage servers
act as storage nodes in a content addressable storage
system for storing content addressable blocks. Our
key servers act as access nodes for providing a frontend layer such as a traditional file system interface.
Further study on detailed cooperation is required.

A cloud storage system modeled in the above is
secure if no probabilistic polynomial time attacker
wins the game with a nonnegligible advantage. A
secure cloud storage system implies that an
unauthorized user or server cannot get the content of
stored messages, and a storage server cannot generate
re-encryption keys by himself. If a storage server can
generate a re-encryption key from the target user to
another user B, the attacker can win the security game
by re-encrypting the ciphertext to B and decrypting
the re-encrypted
ciphertext using the secret key
. Therefore, this
model addresses the security of data storage and data
forwarding.
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